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ABSTRACT
In this Thesis, I explore the role of the book as a medium for philosophy in Gilles Deleuze and
Jacques Derrida. I begin by framing the debate in terms of the role of media in affecting the
message. I then claim that while both Deleuze and Derrida must attempt to separate their own
work from the traditional role of the book, they both fail to take the book itself into
consideration.
I claim that both Deleuze and Derrida accept the book as medium which reinforces a
particular form of thought, and that their philosophies require a break from this form. However,
they do not take the medium of the book itself seriously. Deleuze is only concerned with the text
within the book, and Derrida treats the book as a metaphor for total knowledge. Against both
these thinkers I juxtapose the artist Keith Smith, who does offer examples of thinking in terms of
the book itself, and how doing so can affect the text within, and thus thinking.
The failure on the part of Deleuze and Derrida are particularly striking given the
emphasis they place on the need to separate their philosophies from the modes of thought books
traditionally enforce. Due to their understanding of the importance of the book in the tradition of
philosophy, I claim this investigation of the specific use and ability of the book is of vital
importance.
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CHAPTER 1:
THE END OF THE BOOK AND THE BEGINNING OF BOOK ARTS
At least since Nietzsche, and for all sorts of reasons that no doubt come
together in the reason I invoke, philosophy is at odds with its “form,” that
is with its “style,” which is to say, finally with its address. How does
thinking address itself to itself, to thinking (which also means: how does
thinking address itself to everyone, without its being a matter of a
“comprehension” or “understanding” that might be called “common”)?
How is thinking addressed?1
1.1 Introduction
This epigraph introduces two important concerns that will be addressed in this thesis. First is the
concern of the form of philosophy. That is, how a philosophy is delivered, the form of its
address, is not insignificant. Certain forms are conducive to certain thoughts, and indeed some
thoughts are only possible given particular forms. In keeping with this, Nancy begins his book,
Being Singular Plural, by noting how traditional forms of ontological treatises are not conducive
to his project. Secondly, this concern for forms is a historical development. Nancy invokes
Nietzsche as the starting point. We will see how the particular form explored in this thesis, the
book, is affected by the historical development of mass media, and how Deleuze and Derrida
attempt critiques of the traditional form of the book in hopes of enabling new types of thought.
In the opening chapter of Derrida‟s Of Grammatology, entitled “The End of the Book and
the Beginning of Writing,” he argues that the “end of the book,” also known as the “death of the
book,” is symptomatic of a wider change befalling civilization. This change, the moving away
from phonetic writing as the central aspect of knowledge and experience is also, I believe, the
driving force of Deleuze‟s discussion of the book. Both Derrida and Deleuze question the role of
the book and offer critiques of the thought the book has traditionally enforced. In this

1

Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, trans. Robert D. Richardson and Anne E. O‟Byrne (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2000), p. xv
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introduction, we will briefly examine the “end of the book,” focusing on the communication
theorist Marshall McLuhan. As a central figure in the debate over the influences of new media
over the older tendencies of phonetic writing, a discussion of McLuhan will serve as a starting
point for our examination of the treatment of the book in Deleuze and Derrida.
We will then turn to an introduction of book arts. I will restrict, for our purposes, the field
to bookworks which must be in book form, and those that happen to be in book form, but could
also work in another form. This section will be akin to art history, and as such its connection to
the philosophy to come may be hard to see. To mitigate this concern, I will further restrict our
discussion of book arts to those in codex form and with text. I will argue this gives us an easier
bridge back to philosophy, as well as offering a discussion (chapter 4) of how attention to the
book can change writing.
1.2 The End of the Book
To speak of the end of the book is to claim that the role the book once played has been, or is
being, replaced by something else. It is not to say that no one will read books, or that they will
cease to be produced. In his section we will see how the argument works, focusing on the
communication and social critic Marshall McLuhan. We will begin by an examination of how
the medium of phonetic writing shaped the thinking of Western civilization since the Ancient
Greeks. We will then follow McLuhan‟s examination of the change new media is bringing about,
and how he claims this is moving us from an individualistic society to a global village.
McLuhan begins his investigation of the new media with a discussion of environments.
“Environments,” McLuhan writes, “are not passive wrappings, but active processes.”2
Environments are the configuration of the media of the society in which one lives. An
2

Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (New York: New American Library, 1964)., p.
vii
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environmental change is of vital importance for the values and mentality of a society. Indeed, the
media of a society absolutely affects the entire society. Different media expand different part of
the human faculty. McLuhan writes:
All media work us over completely. They are so pervasive in their
personal, political, economic, aesthetic, psychological, moral, ethical and
social consequences that they leave no part of us untouched, unaffected,
unaltered. The medium is the message. Any understanding of social and
cultural change is impossible without a knowledge of the way media work
as environments. All media are extensions of some human faculty –
psychic or physical.3
For this reason, a change in media is a change in our social and cultural orientation. No
change in environment, furthermore, happens without a substantial change in the
population of the environment.
As for our own age, the “electronic age,” “a totally new environment is has been
created.” The content of this new environment of the electronic age is “the old mechanized
environment of the industrial age.”4
The new environment reprocesses the old one as radically as TV is
reprocessing the film. For the “content” of TV is the movie. TV is
environmental and imperceptible, like all environments. We are only
aware of the “content” of the old environments.5
Our own age, McLuhan claims, is a new environment whose content is the previous
environment.
The new environment, the electronic environment, is replacing the older one based on
phonetic writing. It is with this new environment that we see what is considered the “death of the
book.” This does not mean that books are completely excluded from this new environment, only
3

Marshall McLuhan, The Medium is the Message (New York: Bantam Books, 1967), p. 26
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that the conceptual tools founded on the phonetic writing associated with books is ill-equipped
to deal with the electronic age. McLuhan:
It is true that there is more material written and printed and read today
than ever before, but there is also a new electric technology that threatens
this ancient technology of literacy built on the phonetic writing. …
[E]lectric technology seems to favor the inclusive and participational
spoken word over the specialist written word. Our Western values, built
on the written word, have already been considerably affected by the
electric media of telephone, radio, and TV.6
To this list of electric media we can certainly add the computer and the internet. The “Western
values built on the written word” include an emphasis on the visual over the auditory and a move
from a collective to an individualistic mentality. Phonetic writing served to move the emphasis
of social orientation from the auditory to the visual. “The dominant organ of sensory and social
orientation in pre-alphabetic societies,” McLuhan writes, “was the ear – „hearing was
believing.‟”7 The new environment – alphabetic writing – shifted the emphasis to the visual. This
shift, as a new media and environment, altered social orientation.
The orientation to the eye from the ear heralded a new individualistic mentality. Whereas
with hearing, many people can hear the same thing all at once, with the eye and the written word
individuals started having personal experiences not otherwise experienced. Writing on many of
the same concerns, Walter Ong puts the point this way:
Thirty persons simultaneously reading copies of the same book side-byside in a library do not constitute a group of the sort formed by thirty
persons listening to the same direct live oral presentation or to the same
taped oral presentation on radio or on television. Sound forms community
as reading alone cannot.8
6

Ibid. pp. 84-85

7

Ibid. p. 44

8

Walter J. Ong, “Reading, Technology and the Nature of Man: An Interpretation,” The Yearbook of English Studies,
Vol. 10, Literature and Its Audience, I Special Number. (1980), pp. 132-149; p. 140
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The environment of phonetic writing, with the emphasis on the eye, enables individualism in a
manner not possible in societies with the auditory orientation.
What is important for our purposes is the closure of this environment and the beginning
of another. The electronic media which McLuhan draws attention to favors the spoken word over
the written, and for this reason is a return to the emphasis on the ear over the eye. This return is
also a return to the communal over the individualistic.9 This is the “end of the book.” It is the end
of an environment oriented around the written word, an environment being replaced by new
media with its orientation to the ear. This is also, I believe, the driving force behind Deleuze and
Derrida‟s questioning of the book.
While it does appear to theorists in many fields that the age of the book – tied to the
dominance of the written word – is being superseded by another age, the role of writers is not
clear. That is, philosophy – which is a development within the age of writing and is tied, for
Deleuze and Derrida, to the idea of the book – must come to grips with the idea that the book
does not demand the same monopoly it once enjoyed. The questioning of the book as carried out
by Deleuze and Derrida is an extension of the “end of the book.” This is explicit in Derrida, but
perhaps more implicit in Deleuze, and for this reason our orientation toward the end of the book
will serve to frame the debate in the coming chapters. Put another way: it is the medium of
philosophy that Deleuze and Derrida must challenge in order to come to grips with the role of
their own philosophies, which attempt a break from traditional ways of thinking.

9

Both McLuhan (Understanding Media, introduction, p. viii) and Ong (p. 138) cite Erik Havelock‟s work Preface to
Plato to show how the communal mentality of pre-writing is again being fostered through electronic media‟s
emphasis on non-visual orientation, to a “global village,” as McLuhan says.
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1.3 Book Arts
“Book arts” is a field of art works in which an original piece of art is created in a book form.
Each piece will be known, for our purposes, as a bookwork.10 The field of book arts is large and
varied. We will restrict ourselves to two main strands: bookworks which are simply in books,
and bookworks which rely on the book form to work.11 Ann Moeglin-Delcroix, discussing these
same two options within book arts, makes the distinction between using the book as support, and
using the book as content.12 A book as support is a book which happens to hold a text or image.
It is this type of book that lends itself easily to a separation between the text/image13 and the
book – the text/image is “held” within the book, the book is a container. Moeglin-Delcroix says
of the book as container: “one loses here the perception of the book as a book.”14 The book as
content, on the other hand, uses the form of the book; the work itself is dependent on the form of
the book.
Furthermore, we will restrict our investigation of book arts to works which use the codex
form of the book. This, again, is to help focus our discussion toward the philosophical figures to
follow. So, within book arts we will examine works which use the book as content, instead of as
support, and which use the codex as the book form. I will argue that Keith Smith offers
important examples of how such bookworks can function.

10

For a discussion of book arts and the problems of definitions, see Johanna Drucker, The Century of Artist’s Books,
(New York: Granary Books, 1995); Betty Bright, No Longer Innocent: Book Art in America, 1960-1980 (New York:
Granary Books, 2005)
11

This distinction is meant to be purely descriptive, with no value judgment of the particular bookworks implied.

12

Anne Moeglin-Delcroix, Esthéthiques du livres d’artistes, 1960-1980 (Bibliothèque Nationale de France, 1997).

13

I use “text/image” instead of simply either “text” or “image” because the book form is conducive to both. As we
shall see, an emphasis on bookworks which use text help ease the path back into a discussion of philosophy.
14

Ibid. p.334. Translations of this text are my own.
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Examples of bookworks which are in books, but which function in other forms, include
any work which can be taken from the book and hung on a wall, say, with no detrimental effect
on the art. An example of such a bookwork would be a book of photographs. Though the
collection of photographs maybe an original work of art, that is, it is not simply a reproduction of
photographs which already exists, it is not necessarily the case that such a work needs to be in
book form.
Contrary to this, bookworks which need to be in book form, figures 1 and 2, Keith
Smith‟s Book 106, Construct, rely on the structure of the book to work. Upon opening the cover,
the entirety of the text is visible. Turning the pages removes a letter from the poem, leaving a gap
where the letter was. Turning the first page removes all the “a‟s”, placing them in reverse on the
verso. Each page, when turned takes away another letter, until only the “z‟s” remain on the final
page.

Figure 1 Keith Smith, Book 106, Construct, 1985. Poetry. Offset edition of 200. 22.8 x 13.3
cm. Keith Smith Books.
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Figure 2 Keith Smith, Book 106, Construct. 1985. As the pages are turned, letters are moved
from the poem, on the recto to the verso. With each page turn more and more gaps appear
in the poem.
Smith‟s Book 106 represents a bookwork which utilizes the specific function of the codex
book. The turning of the pages itself is what allows this work to function. It is not the case that
the individual pieces could be separated from the book and hung on a wall. This work requires
it‟s placement within a book. Instead of being merely a container for the texts, Book 106 uses the
book as content.
Another example is Smith‟s Book 126 (Figures 3 and 4). Here Smith uses transparent
pages. This ensures that the book form is necessary to the bookwork. Of this work, Smith writes:
This book has a transparency before each paper print of picture and text.
When the page on the left is placed back over the photo, the combined
texts of the transparency and paper reads, "Damp, my eyes glisten/
Transparent alibis/ torn by your eyes/ words not spoken/ remain/
mistakenly merciful" But when those words or partial words on the
transparency are removed by turning the page, the abridged text says
something very different:
"My eyes listen/ to/ words not spoken/ take me"15
15

Keith Smith, private correspondence. This book, along with the others appearing in this thesis are discussed in
Keith Smith, 200 Books: An Anecdotal Bibliography (Keith Smith Books, 2000).

8

It is the act of moving through the book which alters the text and the images. This act is possible
precisely because the work is in book form.

Figure 3 Keith Smith, Book 126, In Between Lines, 1988. Edition of 15. Silver prints and
texts on transparencies. Supported Concertina binding with clam shell. 34.9 x 27.9 x 4 cm.

9

Figure 4 Keith Smith, Book 126, In Between Lines, 1988. The movement through the book
alters the text and image. This is an example of using the book as content.
Smith‟s Book 106 and Book 126 represent examples of bookworks which use the book as
content. These bookworks only work in books. Contrarily, to think of a book as support leads to
theories of separating the text from the book. The book as content does not lend itself to such
questions: it is not a matter of having a text which is simply placed within a book, a text which
just as easily could be hung on a wall or read on a computer; rather, it is to think of the book as
being a special medium whose function can be used to enhance specific elements of texts or
images.
1.4. The Coming Terrain
Armed with the ideas presented in sections 1.2 and 1.3 of this chapter we can now move on to
examine the treatment of the book in Deleuze and Derrida. In section 1.2 we saw that the “death
of the book” was a prevalent thought among theorists during the rise of TV and electronic media.

10

This pervades both Deleuze‟s and Derrida‟s treatment of the book. In section 1.3 we saw how the
book could be treated as content, as opposed to container or support.
Our examination of the two thinkers to come will vary based on their treatment of the
book. We will see that while Deleuze writes on the possibilities of the book, he never gets
beyond thinking only of the text within the book. For this reason, we will begin by examining his
treatment of literature, how his distinction between difference in literature and difference as
literature works. We will then apply this same distinction to this discussion of the book. Whereas
with literature he is concerned with difference, we will see that in terms of the role of the book,
he is concerned with the connection it makes in the world. These connections are explored in
relation to his idea of the rhizome, which can connect any point with any other point. From this
we can ask about rhizomes in books and rhizomes as books. Deleuze‟s own terminology leaves
a gap where a discussion of the book, as a book, could be.
Similarly, Derrida, while he writes a good deal about the book, continues to treat it as a
metaphor for total knowledge. For this reason, we will begin with his treatment of the history of
writing, and how a shift from phonetic writing signals a move away from the book – again, as
total knowledge. We will then examine later writings by Derrida, in which he reflects back on his
writing on the book as metaphor and attempts to think of the book itself. Here again, we will see,
he continues to slip into a discussion of the book as metaphor. He never treats the book as
concrete physical object. I will argue this is because he begins by thinking of the book as
support. Such a starting point leads to questions on possible separations of the book and text.
Against both Deleuze and Derrida‟s treatment of the book, I will make the case that Keith
Smith represents a way to think with the book. Paralleling the distinction between the book as
support and the book as content, we will see a distinction Smith makes between the “running

11

manuscript” and the “book experience.” The former is a single strand of text, which is then put
“in” a book. As such, the book is merely a support for the text. Alternately, the book experience
is the use of the book in conjunction with the text; it is to use them both. We examine Smith‟s
case for this distinction by following his examples from the use of the spacing of words, through
the structure of the page, and finally the relation of the pages to each other.
The restriction of our scope to bookworks with words and in the codex form is meant to
help bridge the gap between the philosophy and the art. I believe Keith Smith gives us reason to
think treating the book as content can alter the way writing is done. For this reason, I believe the
treatment of the book in Deleuze and Derrida is philosophically interesting. If it is correct that
thinking of the book in terms of content – and not only in terms of the text within the book or the
book as a metaphor – can change writing, the question of the treatment of the book is a very
important idea.16

16

Though outside the scope of this thesis, the notions explored here of form and content are interesting, I think, in
terms of Heidegger‟s discussion of the work of art. Heidegger‟s attempt to break with the hylomorphic sense of art
(where form is imposed upon matter) could benefit from exploring the use of form, in book arts in general and Keith
Smith particularly, in that the form is made in conjunction with the content. See “Origin of the Work of Art,”
Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1971).
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CHAPTER 2:
DELEUZE AND THE BOOK
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter I will examine the use of literary examples in Deleuze‟s work Difference and
Repetition and Deleuze and Guattari‟s A Thousand Plateaus. Deleuze uses these examples to
illustrate how it is possible to think difference-in-itself. After a brief discussion of difference, as
well as Deleuze‟s inclusion of the virtual and the actual as part of reality, I will look at various
literary examples he offers, and make a distinction between difference in literature and difference
as literature. This is an implicit distinction in Deleuze‟s discussion of literature, and its
explication will aid us in understanding how Deleuze, like McLuhan, takes the medium to be an
important aspect in determining thought. In section 2.3 I will very briefly outline the role of
literature in Aristotle. This will place the difference Deleuze attempts to illustrate in clear
contrast. I will then discuss difference in literature, focusing on Deleuze‟s examples of Proust
and Borges. In section 2.4, I will make a case for thinking of Joyce as exemplifying difference as
literature, wherein literature does not serve as the stage in which talk about difference occurs, but
rather the form of literature displays difference. That is to say, difference as literature serves to
make explicit difference itself through the medium of language.
In the second part of this chapter, I will argue that the “in/as” distinction introduced in
our discussion of literature can function regarding materiality of the book as discussed in
Deleuze and Guattari‟s A Thousand Plateaus. That is, Deleuze and Guattari examine the medium
of the book and claim that the thought which books have traditionally enforced – linearity, etc. –
can be replaced if the book is changed. In 2.5 I examine Deleuze and Guattari‟s distinction
between the root-book, the fascicular book and the rhizome book. In 2.6 I will discuss the role of
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the book as a rhizome meant to make connections in the world and how Deleuze and Guattari
claim even Joyce does not go far enough. Materiality, I will argue in 2.7, has the capacity to do
work, but is overlooked in Deleuze and Guattari‟s discussion of the book. This oversight is odd,
and indeed glaring, given the distinction they make between natural reality and spiritual reality,
which they use to evaluate both root-books and fascicular books. I will end by examining how
the idea of rhizome books works particularly well in relation to theories of hypertext. From this, I
conclude that the form of the book serves as a detriment to Deleuze‟s idea of the rhizome. That
is, because he focuses on the text within the book, and not the book itself, the rhizome structure
he seeks is better found through hypertext. It is merely an unfortunate necessity that a book is
required for the text at all. Instead of focusing on the medium of the book, as they set out to,
Deleuze and Guattari only focus on the medium of writing.
2.2 Difference-in-Itself
By difference, Deleuze means the variations which enable our conceptions of objects and ideas.
Difference-in-itself is an attempt to think of difference without relying on predicates or identities.
I will follow his discussion of difference from Difference and Repetition,17 juxtaposing it with
Plato‟s notion of difference as deviation from an idea.18 By understanding difference as Deleuze
thinks it, we can understand how it is meant to work in literature and in relation to books.
To understand difference itself, Deleuze claims we must break with the history of
philosophy, which, from Plato to Heidegger,19 made difference the difference between objects.
Where the objects are self identical, the difference represents a lack, a relation of different

17

Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

18

Deleuze also distinguishes his notion of difference from that of Aristotle (Ibid. pp. 30-35), Hegel and Leibniz
(Ibid. pp 42-50).
19

The inclusion of Heidegger in this history, justified in Difference and Repetition, pp. 64-66, may be controversial,
but for our purposes it is necessary only to note the tradition Deleuze takes himself to be in contrast with.
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objects to each other. The subordination of the different to the same has been the project of
philosophy, to break from this is to think difference-in-itself. Deleuze writes,
The whole of Platonism … is dominated by the idea of drawing a
distinction between „the thing itself‟ and the simulacra. Difference is not
thought in itself but related to a ground, subordinated to the same and
subject to mediation in mythic form. Overturning Platonism, then, means
denying the primacy of the original over copy, of model over image;
glorifying the reign of simulacra and reflections.20
To overturn Platonism is to rethink the role of difference; from thinking difference as the relation
between objects to thinking of it as a dynamic force in its own right.
What then becomes of unity? How can we think of difference itself and objects at the
same time? Deleuze claims that the unity of objects is a secondary order to difference.
While the history of philosophy took identity as primary, as coming first, difference is in fact the
beginning of identity.
That identity not be first, that it exists as a principle but as a second
principle, as a principle become; that it revolve around the Different:
such would be the nature of a Copernican revolution which opens up the
possibility of difference having its own concept, rather than being
maintained under the domination of a concept in general already
understood as identical.21
From difference comes identity. Difference, rather than being relegated to the role of difference
between, or lack of sameness, can be thought in itself. Identity, which has been the starting point
of philosophy, takes a secondary role, in this account, to difference.
To understand how identity can arise from difference, Deleuze invokes the notions of the
virtual and the actual. Both the virtual and the actual, he claims, are included in reality.
The virtual is opposed not to the real but to the actual. The virtual is fully
real in so far as it is virtual. … Indeed, the virtual must be defined as
20

Difference and Repetition, p. 66

21

Ibid., pp. 40-41
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strictly a part of the real object – as though the object had one part of itself
in the virtual into which it plunged as though into an objective
dimension.22
The virtual is as much a part of reality as the actual. The virtual here is not the same as the
possible. As opposed to the possible, which is the actual minus existence, the virtual is real. “The
possible,” Deleuze writes, “is opposed to the real; the process undergone by the possible is
therefore a „realization‟. By contrast, the virtual is not opposed to the real; it possesses a full
reality by itself. The process it undergoes is that of actualization.”23 In terms of the actual and the
possible the possible is not real, it is the actual that needs to be “realized,” or brought into the
real. Contrary to this, the virtual is already real; the process by which identities come from the
virtual is “actualization.”
Furthermore, the virtual is unlike potential in that the identity (the actual) which result
from the virtual is not predicable. Unlike the possible, which is in the likeness of the real (when
it is “realized” it is like the real), the virtual is actualized through difference. The virtual is the
process which enables the actual as the product. The product does not resemble the process.
The actualization of the virtual … always takes place by difference,
divergence and differenciation [the expression of the actualization of the
virtual]. Actualization breaks with resemblances as a process no less than
it does with identity as a principle. Actual terms never resemble the
singularities they incarnate.24
The virtual is a field of difference from which the process of actualization enables the emergence
of objects.
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Deleuze uses examples from literature and art to convey the notions of virtual and actual,
of difference-in-itself. James Williams writes:
In order to convey the sensual aspect of this relation between the virtual
and the actual, [Deleuze] dramatizes the role played by the virtual in real
thought through an artistic form and through examples from aesthetics.25
We will focus on the literary examples Deleuze uses to dramatize the role of difference and the
virtual. By difference in literature, I will mean that the literature in question represents a field in
which difference – the virtual out of which various products arise – is displayed. Difference as
literature will mean that the form of literature – the words, sentences, syntax – will represent a
break from the actual and a return to the virtual. That is, the structure of the literature, the
medium of literature, will be such to draw attention to the virtual field of difference behind the
actual products.26
2.3 Difference in Literature
In this section, I will focus on the examples of Proust and Borges, and show how these articulate
the idea of difference within literature. In section 2.4, I will offer Joyce‟s Finnegan’s Wake as an
example of difference as literature. But first, for the purposes of contrast I will briefly sketch a
more traditional, Aristotelian model of literature. This will set in stark contrast Deleuze‟s own
view.
For Aristotle, literature offers a catalog of typologies. This typology was an
epistemological saving grace for literature according to Aristotle. In Poetics,27 Aristotle uses
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Oedipus as an example. The role of literature is to show what a type of person would do in a
certain situation. Oedipus, the character, represents a type of person – we can call this type X. X
represents people who, like Oedipus, have certain qualities, such as nobility, courage,
intelligence and hot-headedness. Literature tells what a person in type X would do, or would
probably do, if they were in Oedipus‟ situation. They would be courageous enough to try to
thwart fate by fleeing their home. They would be noble enough to want to find the individual
responsible for the plague. They would get angry at Teiresias‟ manner of speech. And, as a
result, type X would probably, in some manner, share a similar fate as Oedipus‟.
For Aristotle, then, the role of literature is to provide a model of similitude. A value of
literature, in so far as it has value, is that it provides an epistemologically valid model of types by
which we can learn what certain people would (probably) do in certain situations.28 Aristotle‟s
emphasis on similitude is easily juxtaposed against Deleuze‟s own view. For Deleuze (some)
literature exemplifies difference. Instead of serving as a model for typology, for Deleuze
literature serves the epistemological role of revealing difference-in-itself.
We are now in a position to discuss the role of difference in literature. Deleuze mentions
Proust often in Difference and Repetition. Deleuze uses In Search of Lost Time to illustrate
aspects as varied as hidden, symbolic representation29 and time consciousness and
remembrance.30 The point for our purposes, however, is the manner in which Deleuze believes
Proust explicates the qualities of difference-in-itself.31 It is the characters and events in the novel,
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the circumstances and situations, which explain difference. That is, within Proust‟s work, there
are elements that can, when read in a Deleuzian manner, help explain difference.
Marc Seem, in his article, „Liberation of Difference: Toward a Theory of
Antiliterature,‟32 discusses a passage of Proust‟s work and how Deleuze uses it to explain
difference in itself. The following passage is from Volume 2 of Proust‟s Remembrance of Things
Past:
Among all these people ... [were] the girls whom I noticed, with that
mastery over their limbs which comes from perfect bodily condition and a
sincere contempt for the rest of humanity ... advancing straight ahead,
without hesitation or stiffness, performing exactly those movement which
they wished to perform, each of their members in full independence of the
rest, the greater part of their bodies preserving that immobility which is so
noticeable in a good waltzer. ... Although each was of a type totally
different from the others, they all had beauty; but to tell the truth, I had
seen them for such a short time, and without venturing to look at them
straight in the face, that I had not yet individualized any of them ...
(according to the order in which their series met the eye, marvelous
because the most different aspects came new on another...). ... And this
want in my vision, of the demarcations which I should presently establish
between them sent flooding over the group a wave of harmony, the
continuous transfusion of beauty fluid, collective and mobile.33
Seem claims this scene exemplifies difference. Seem says this scene illustrates, “a nebulous
beginning, nondifferentialtion of the group (where each girl contains in a way the essence of the
others), where the “colors and shapes of the girls intermingle,” but where singularities and
difference exists. That is, this scene provides a collection of pure difference. Before the girls are
individualized for the narrator, before he distinguishes “between them,” their beauty exists in
field of “transfusion… fluid, collective and mobile.” This fluid collective is similar to Deleuze‟s
notion of the virtual and is what serves as an example of difference.
32
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For our purposes, it is enough to note that the passage quoted above is meant to convey a
sense of difference. Within the medium of literature, difference exists. The medium, however, is
not fundamentally altered: the sentences are of standard construction; the scene conveys a
thought that moves in one direction. In short, the scene above carries the reader through a scene.
This is what I call difference in literature, in that difference is shown within literature.
Borges‟ story, „The Garden of Forking Paths‟34 is the second example of difference in
literature. In the story, a book is written which is also a labyrinth. It represents numerous
possibilities, of which all outcomes happen. In the book (entitled The Garden of Forking Paths)
the story is fractured, and the ancestor of the author complains that “it is an indeterminate heap
of contradictory drafts... in the third chapter the hero dies, in the fourth he is alive.”35 The book is
contradictory because it represents time as an infinite collection of possibilities that are
simultaneously occurring.
In terms of Deleuze‟s notion of difference and the virtual, this story represents difference
through the maze-like contradictions of the events. That is, the book in the story, which contains
many unformed possibilities, acts similar to the virtual, which enables many actual outcomes.
But what is even more significant, for our purposes, is the role difference plays within the story
itself – within Borges‟ literature. Difference is exemplified within the story, but not by the story.
The story itself – the medium of the literature – is not an example of difference; rather the book
within the story serves that purpose. For this reason, I call this difference in literature. Literature
serves as field within which difference is displayed.
Deleuze uses examples from the writings of Proust and Borges in his description of
difference. The point to stress is that difference appears within these stories; it is not the form of
34
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these stories. That is to say there are examples of difference in these stories, but the stories
themselves are not examples of difference.
2.4 Finnegan’s Wake and Difference as Literature
In this section, I will use James Joyce‟s novel, Finnegan’s Wake, as an example of difference as
literature. Deleuze mentions Joyce‟s work at several points in Difference and Repetition,
specifically noting the role of difference within the language. Speaking of Joyce‟s novel,
Deleuze writes, “The identity of the object read really dissolves into divergent series defined by
esoteric words, just as the identity of the reading subject is dissolved into the decentred circles of
possible multiple readings.”36 That is, the virtual is dramatized through the language itself.
Difference as literature is difference in literary form. Finnegan’s Wake is an example of
such difference. As Deleuze writes,
“Joyce‟s work ... [is a] question of drawing together a maximum of
disparate series ... (here, esoteric words, portmanteau words) which rely
upon no prior identity, which are above all not „identifiable‟ in principle,
but which induce a maximum of resemblance and identity into the system
as a whole, as though this were the result of the process of differentiation
of difference in itself...37
Whereas Borges and Proust use language to write about difference, Joyce‟s very form
demonstrates the virtual field of difference. The use of obscure and invented words, along with
paradoxical story arches reveals the virtual processes behind the actual products.
Take, for example, the two opening paragraphs of Finnegan’s Wake.
riverrun, past Eve and Adam‟s, from swerve of shore to bend of
bay, brings us by a commodius vicus of recirculation back to Howth
Castle and Environs.
Sir Tristram, violer d‟amores, fr‟over the short sea, had passencore
rearrived from North Armorica on this side the scraggy isthmus of Europe
Minor to weilderfight his penisolate woar: nor had topsawyer‟s rocks by
36
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the streawm Oconee exaggerated themselse to Laurens County‟s gorgios
while they went doubling their mumper all the time: nor avoice from afire
bellowsed mishe mishe to tauftauf thruartpeatrick: not yet, though
venissoon after, had a kidscad buttended a bland old Isaac: not yet though
all‟s fair in vanessy, were sosie sesthers wroth with twone nathandjoe. Rot
a peck of pa‟s malt had Jhem or Shen brewed by arclight and rory end to
the regginbrow was t o be seen ringsome on the aquaface.38
The portmanteaus in this passage serve to sever the virtual from the actual. The form of the
literature is not tied to the actual, but rather remains in the virtual. The reader is not able to read
Joyce‟s paragraphs in the manner in which she could read, say, the Borges quoted above. The
obvious difference between the two is Joyce‟s use of language. It is the language itself that
exemplifies difference-in-itself.
The language and the events of Joyce‟s work set it against the work of Borges and Proust.
While these former write difference in literature, Joyce uses difference as literature. His words
and story exemplify difference itself. Thus Joyce differs from the other writers in that his
literature is difference. In terms of mediums: Joyce‟s use of the medium is what exemplifies
difference, whereas Proust and Borges work within the medium without altering it.
2.5 Deleuze and the Book
I have argued in favor of seeing literature as working with difference in two ways: difference in
literature and difference as literature. I now want to turn the same in/as distinction to Deleuze
and Guattari‟s use of the book. I take Deleuze and Guattari‟s discussion of the book to be
necessary. That is, they must attempt to rethink the book given the emphasis on difference
instead of identity. Just as Finnegan’s Wake displayed difference through the form of the
literature, Deleuze and Guattari must make a case for the book being able to display difference
through its form. It is because the mode of communication affects what can be communicated
that Deleuze and Guattari must attempt a re-thinking of the book. If the traditional book favors a
38
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particular mode of thought, a break from this traditional book is necessary. Just as the form of
literature is the words, sentences and syntax, the form of the book is the materiality of the
physical book. It is precisely in relation to the necessity of thinking of the form that they fail, I
argue, because while they criticize “traditional” books in terms of their materiality, they do not
do the same for what they call the “rhizome book.”
To understand how Deleuze and Guattari fail in this regard, I will parallel the question of
the book to the question of literature. To parallel this question in relation to the book, we must
ask what Deleuze and Guattari claim the book can do then ask if there is a similar in/as
distinction. As we shall see, Deleuze and Guattari think of the book as exemplifying the virtual39
through its connections with the world. We would thus expect a discussion of the book to ask
how the material make-up of the book, that is, the form of the book – what Deleuze and Guattari
will call the “natural reality” of the book –can enhance the book‟s connection with the world. We
will see that Deleuze and Guattari make a distinction between three types of books, and even
Finnegan’s Wake fails to make the necessary connections with the world to constitute the highest
potentiality of the book.
Deleuze and Guattari open A Thousand Plateaus with a discussion of the book. They
write:
A book has neither object nor subject; it is made of variously formed
matters [matières], and very different dates and speeds. To attribute the
book to a subject is to overlook this working of matters [matières], and the
exteriority of their relations. It is to fabricate a beneficent God to explain
geological movements.... There is no difference between what a book talks
about and how it is made. Therefore a book also has no object.40
39
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Here Deleuze and Guattari are moving beyond the traditional mode of book, what they call the
root-book. They are also, however, doing something more. Matière, translated as „matters‟ in the
above passages, has the alternate English translation of „materials‟. Matière is translated as
matter in other contexts,41 and similar treatment in the case of books enhances a deeper
discussion of books in A Thousand Plateaus, or so I shall argue. For books, the materiality is the
form, in the same manner in which language is the form of literature. This then raises the
question not only of the use of the subject and object of books – what books are about, the
subjectivity of the author, and how they should be read – but also of the materiality, or form, of
books. This, I believe, is a deeper topic related to Deleuze and Guattari‟s analysis of the book.
Before the implications are examined, however, we need to understand more about their view of
the role of books.
Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between three types of books: the root-book, the
fascicular book and the rhizome book. Furthermore, a distinction is introduced between the
natural and spiritual reality of the book. The former is the actual material construction of the
book; the latter is the construction of the ideas the book produces. Deleuze and Guattari examine
not only the traditional role of books, but also some recent attempts to manipulate the material
form of the book.
Root-books are the traditional form of books, both in construction and in purpose. They
represent the root-tree type of thought; the linear thought wherein one thought must follow
another. Deleuze and Guattari write,
Arborescent systems are hierarchical systems with centers of significance
and subjectivication, central automata like organized memories. In the
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corresponding models, an element only receives information from a higher
unit, and only receives a subjective affection along preestablished paths.42
The arborescent system, the system of tree roots, represents a system of specified path-ways.
This is to say, traditional books focus on the products of the actual, ignoring the process of the
virtual. Identities are given primacy; difference is relegated to difference between identities. The
pre-established paths of the roots are directly contrary to the various connections available to the
virtual, or, as we shall soon see, the rhizomatic.
As Bonta and Protevi write, a “root-book may be a world unto itself (the final word, the
decisive treatment); the development of themes from beginning to end.”43 This book is one that
represents reality; it argues effectively and has the final say in the matter at hand. This
representation is seen in both the natural and spiritual realities of the book:
[T]he book as a natural reality is a tap-root, with its pivotal spine and
surrounding leaves. But the book as a spiritual reality, the Tree or Root as
an image, endlessly develops the law of the One that becomes two, then
the two that become four ... Binary logic is the spiritual reality of the roottree.44
In the root-book both the nature and spirit of the book work to represent the word through logical
steps. In terms of the relation to the virtual and the actual, the root-book represents only the
actual. It does not exemplify difference-in-itself. Indeed, in its logical procession, it serves to
cover over the virtual in terms of the actual.
For our purposes, it is important to note the use of the natural reality, the physical makeup of the book, in Deleuze and Guattari‟s account of the root book. While they claim the root
book represents traditional, linear, fixed thought, they focus on the materiality of the book – the
42
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form of the book – to enhance this claim. That is, the form of the book represents the manner of
thought as much as the “spiritual reality” of the book.
The second type of book, the fascicular book, operates slightly differently. Here the form
of the book is altered. This book is not necessarily constructed of a “pivotal spine and
surrounding leaves,” like the root-book. In this case, “natural reality is what aborts the principal
root.”45 However, the spiritual reality remains unaltered. Though the form of the book has
changed, the idea remains the same. Deleuze and Guattari use as an example William
Burroughs‟s cut-up method. This method, used in his novel Exterminator!, among other works,
uses cut up pages of text reattached at various points.
The effect is similar to collages in painting, and flash-forwards and flash-backs in film.
For instance, one page from late in a novel and a page from early in a novel could be cut up and
rearranged and appear in the middle of the novel. When the new page is reached some of the text
is familiar, some is not, but the whole page is different and clearly out of place.46 Deleuze and
Guattari‟s point must be that while the pages are cut and moved around the basic unity of the text
remains. That is, this manipulation of the pages must still fail to connect with the virtual. For this
reason, Deleuze and Guattari claim neither the root-book not the fascicular book fully depart
from the traditional modes of the book.
In contrast to these, Deleuze and Guattari characterize the rhizome book as one that does
escape the trappings of traditional books. Rhizomes create connections; they connect at all points
to any other points. Wherein root-books move in only one direction, rhizome books are
characterized by connections and flexibility. They can be read starting at any point, and all points
45
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in the book connect with all others. Furthermore, the rhizome book “is good if it works for a
certain purpose, not necessarily if it sounds pretty or argues effectively.”47 Rhizome books, then,
are about connections and creating a connection with the reader in a manner that root-books are
not. That is, they act similarly to the virtual field in which connections and fluidity are a defining
aspect; it is difference in books, similar to how the Proust and Borges stories were difference in
literature. And, of course, A Thousand Plateaus is meant to be a rhizome book.
The rhizome book, however, is not subject to the same discussion of natural reality.
When discussing rhizome books, Deleuze and Guattari refer only to rhizome writings, passing
over any mention of the construction of such a book.48 They mention that they “have been
criticized for overquoting literary authors.”49 It seems we must here add to such criticisms.
Instead of discussing the natural reality, that is, the materiality, of rhizome books, Deleuze and
Guattari resort to examples of literary works. Our question now becomes: Why was materiality
passed over in the discussion of rhizome books? And, in relation, is there any benefit to an
increased emphasis on the materiality of the book?
2.6. Rhizomes in Books
To answer this question, we need to look again at the role of what Deleuze and Guattari call the
spiritual reality of the book. By spiritual reality, I believe they mean the role the book insofar as
it makes connections. It is the effect that the medium has on thought. Traditional books are
conducive to traditional modes of thought – thinking the actual to the detriment of the virtual; the
same to the detriment of difference. Similar to Deleuze‟s use of literary examples to dramatize
the relation of the virtual and the actual, I take his emphasis on the spiritual reality of the book as
47
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a parallel dramatization. For example, the spiritual reality of a root-book serves the purpose of
postulating a hierarchical tree of thought. This hierarchy posits a reality through the book, a
reality of binary logical thought. The emphasis, then, is on the purpose of the book; the way it
interacts and creates connection (or fails to do so).
Again, this is Deleuze and Guattari‟s criticism of the fascicular book. Though the
material construction of the book is changed, the underlying relation between the book and the
world – that is, the spiritual reality – remains the same. And, in fact, in this regard they do not
think even Joyce goes far enough:
Joyce‟s words, accurately described as having “multiple roots,” shatter the
linear unity of the word, even of language, only to posit a cyclic unity of
the sentence, text, or knowledge.50
The alteration of the natural reality of the book is not enough. Though Joyce uses the medium of
literature to dramatize difference, he does not exemplify rhizome books. It seems then, that in
terms of the book, the medium would be explored. Deleuze and Guattari, however, are not
concerned with the structure of the book in terms of the pages and spine; they focus on the
connections between the world and book – the thought and actions that the book encourages.
This connection occurs at the level of the spiritual reality. Even Joyce, whose language dissolves
so much, continues to “posit a cyclic unity” of knowledge. That is, his books do not go far
enough in connecting with the outside word.
It is at this point that we can understand how the in/as distinction introduced and
defended above can be applied to the book. Only a select sample of literature served as examples
of difference in literature. In the same way, only books that function in the world in a particular
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way can serve as examples of rhizomes in books. Joyce‟s books cannot. The question is, which
books can?
It should come as no surprise that A Thousand Plateaus is supposed to connect to the
world in such a way as to constitute a rhizome book. So what does it mean to make connections
with the world? Deleuze and Guattari write,
Contrary to a deeply rooted belief, the book is not an image of the world.
It forms a rhizome with the world, there is an aparallel evolution of the
book and the world; the book assures the deterritorialization of the world,
but the world effects a reterritorialization of the book, which in turn
reterritorializes itself in the world (if it is capable, if it can).51
A territory is a habit of motion and action. To deterritorialize is to break with that habit,
reterritorialization is the formation of a new one. Similar to a move from the actual to the virtual,
and back again to a reformed actual product, this is a recall to difference itself. Furthermore, this
means that the rhizome book works in such a way that the world is altered by its presence. That
is, there is a flash or connection between the reader and the book such that the world is
reconstituted for the reader, a rewiring of the brain. Then the book is reterritortialized by the
world in its now altered state. Deleuze and Guattari continue this thought:
There is no longer a tripartite division between a field of reality (the
world) and a field of representation (the book) and a field of subjectivity
(the author). Rather, an assemblage establishes connections between
certain multiplicities drawn from each of these orders, so that a book has
no sequel nor the world as its object nor one or several authors as its
subject. In short, we think that one cannot write sufficiently in the name of
an outside.52
The book is not a representation of the world. It is not a closed system of knowledge. Rather it is
a collection of assemblages, of connections.
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Take, for example, A Thousand Plateaus. The point is to have the book connect for the
reader in a manner that changes the world for the reader. The book is to make connections at all
points of the world. A rhizome is supposed to connect at any point: “any point of a rhizome can
be connected to anything other, and must be.”53 These connections are similar to the virtual field
which we used to investigate the role of literature as dramatizations of the virtual field and
difference-in-itself. In much the same way difference in literature offered a place to think
difference, without the medium being difference, so, it seems, the rhizome book offers a place to
show difference without using the medium itself.
2.7 Rhizome as Books
We can now return to the questions that ended section 2.5. Why, in the discussion of rhizome
books is materiality passed over? Both root-books and fascicular books are subject to a
distinction between natural and spiritual reality. Even when the fascicular book moved beyond
the traditional construction of writing it was criticized for maintaining the traditional spiritual
reality of the book. Burroughs was an example of this. However, when Deleuze and Guattari
move to the discussion of the rhizome book, they continue to slide into literary examples.
The in/as distinction set up in the discussion of literary examples is an emphasis on the
form of the medium. Difference as literature uses the form – the language – to dramatize
difference. The lack of the same emphasis in the discussion of the book is glaring. Why are the
first two types of book critiqued in terms of their material structure if the rhizome book is not? I
propose that Deleuze and Guattari are not interested in the book, but only in the writing in the
book. To understand why this might be the case, let us turn to an example of how Deleuze and
Guattari propose a rhizome book could possibly work, then to some theory on hypertext.
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In speaking of the ideal of a book, Deleuze and Guattari claim that books can work in a
similar manner as a plane of consistency. A plane of consistency is the flat plane in which lines
of flight occur. It is flat because in that there are no added dimensions, there are only the lines of
flight. Lines of flight are possible deterritorializations. They are connections that lead to new
creations and novel reterritorializations. That is, they are similar to a departure from the actual
into the virtual, which enables new actualizations. Deleuze and Guattari write:
The ideal for a book would be to lay everything out on a plane of
exteriority of this kind, on a single page, the same sheet: lived events,
historical determinations, concepts, individuals, groups, social
formations.54
Ideally, then, the book could function as a plane of constancy when all laid out on a large, single
sheet.
It is here that we see how the material reality of the root book is not an issue. There is no
concern for the form of the book. In fact the form of the book may be a liability – ideally, there
would be no pages, only a single, flat sheet. This is not merely to say, that a sheet of this sort
described here is not a book. As we saw above, Deleuze and Guattari claim books are made of
different matters/materials. Rather, what we are claiming is that though Delueze and Guattari
take A Thousand Plateaus to be a rhizome book, it has nothing to do with the form of the book
because ideally it would be much different in form.
Another reason to doubt the importance of the physical form of the book to the notion of
rhizomatics (the study of rhizomes) is apparent through theories on hypertext. Drawing on
Deleuze and Guattari, much has been written on the rhizomatic nature of hypertext and other
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phenomena newly possible due to the Internet.55 Stuart Moulthrop points out how hypertext, or
the “information technology consisting of individual blocks of text, or lexias, and the electronic
links that join them,”56 can be linked to Deleuze and Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus can be
thought of as “an incunabular hypertext.”57 That is, A Thousand Plateaus in its construction as
plateaus, which can be read in any order, is a proto-hypertext. Though Deleuze and Guattari were
writing before technology allowed for rhizomatic innovations available today, they characterized
such writing in the printed word. And indeed, it seems that Deleuze and Guattari would have
been better off doing their rhizome writing with hypertext instead of with a book. The book form
seems to be nothing but the most convenient place for a text they take to be rhizomatic.
We can see, then, through the ideal nature of the book as a single sheet of flat paper and
through theories of hypertext as rhizomatic, that the book itself has nothing to do with rhizome
writing. Again, Deleuze and Guattari‟s own project required them to separate their work from
that of “traditional” books. But the nature of the book that they put forth, as traditional books reenforcing traditional thought, seems specified to enable them to juxtapose their own writing
against it. But this does not seem to have anything to do with the book itself. In fact, it seems that
the book is a regrettable necessity for them. That is, their text would have worked better in other
forms, but because it shared a similar form to more traditional books, those books had to be
separated from what they took themselves to be doing.
Deleuze and Guattari, we have seen, understood the need to critique the medium of
books. This is because they take the medium to be conducive to particular forms of thought. This
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need is exactly where they fail, however, in that they do not consider the book itself but only the
writing within the book.
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CHAPTER 3:
DERRIDA AND THE BOOK

3.1 Introduction
The role of the book in Derrida‟s Of Grammatology58 arises in his examination of the
ethnocentricism and logocentricism of phonetic writing. Phonetic writing is ethnocentric because
it is generally thought to the highest form of writing, the end toward which non-phonetic writing
tends, making the West the culmination of a progression of history; logocentric because it
privileges the logos, or thought, as the center and origin of all signifiers – first the voice and, by
extension, writing. We will see that the movement of writing away from phonetic writing – that
is, the use of the term “writing” for things other than phonetic signification – is symptomatic of a
move away from phonetic writing as the center of thought. This de-centering of phonetic writing
has far-reaching effects for the metaphysics based on this system of writing.
In section 3.2 we will explain what Derrida sees as the epoch of exterior writing, as he
traces the dominant theme of writing as a “signifier of a signifier.” In section 3.3 will see how
the idea of the sign carries with it the signifier and the signified, as well as the sensible and
intelligible. We will outline Derrida‟s claim that the entirety of Western metaphysics is possible
only within a system that already makes these distinctions. Section 3.4 will show the historical
distinction Derrida points out between “good” and “bad” writing, and the use of the metaphorical
book to represent totality of knowledge. Against this “good” writing – God‟s writing on the heart
of man, the book of Nature, etc. – Derrida juxtaposes his notion of writing, which is devoid of
such totality. Furthermore, we shall see that this distinction is used in Derrida not only in Of
Grammatology, but also in Writing and Difference and Positions.
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The distinctions made in all these works between a metaphorical notion of the book and
writing leaves room, I shall argue in section 3.5, for questioning the lack of attention to the book
as a concrete, physical object. That is, while writing is subject to discussion in both its “good”
and “bad” aspects, the book is only treated as a metaphor. We will also see how, years after
writing Of Grammatology, Derrida takes up the question of the “book to come,” and asks about
the many supports a book can adopt. This emphasis on the book as support, as a container for the
text within, leads Derrida to slide back into a metaphorical discussion of the book. Once the
support is taken as something added onto text, it becomes a question of liberating the latter from
the former. Derrida, like Deleuze, understands the importance of the medium of the book in
affecting thought and thus must separate what he‟s doing from what books have traditionally
done. Like Deleuze, I will argue that Derrida fails to take the book itself into consideration, and
for this reason fails to truly explore the use of the medium to achieve an affect on thought.
3.2 The Epoch of Exterior Writing
Derrida‟s examination focuses on “a situation [that] has always already been announced,”59 but
which is more prominently evident today. The exhaustion of the epoch of the superiority of
speech over writing is seen through the “death of the book,” which calls for a new mutation in
the understanding of writing. That is, the death of the book – which should be understood as
Hegel‟s “end of religion,” or “end of art,” which is not to say practices which fall under such
titles will cease to operate, but rather that they have reached their completion and have been
surpassed by other means of fulfilling similar needs – opens a new understanding of writing, in
which it is not subservient to the operations of the book. As we shall see, Derrida has a particular
notion of the “operations of the book.” Before we turn to these, let us see how he characterizes
the exhaustion of the epoch of exterior writing.
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“For some time now,” Derrida writes, “one says „language‟ for action, movement,
thought, reflection, consciousness, unconsciousness, experience, affectivity, etc.” Language
served as the conceptual tool through which we understood not only the relation to the voice, but
many things in the world.
Now we tend to say “writing” for all that and more: to designate not only
the physical gestures of literal pictographic or ideographic inscription, but
also the totality of what makes it possible; and also beyond the signifying
face the signified face itself. And thus we say “writing” for all that gives
rise to an inscription in general, whether it is literal or not and even if what
it distributes in space is alien to the order of the voice: cinematography,
choreography, of course, but also pictorial, musical, sculptural “writing.”60
That “writing,” is said of things which are alien to the voice is the exhaustion of the epoch of
exterior writing. For reasons we will see in the next section, the epoch in question relies on a
signifying regression from writing (as phonetic writing) through the voice to thought. Before we
move on to this, it is important to look more closely at the change in the relation of writing to the
voice that allows Derrida to outline its closure.61
Christopher Johnson‟s study of the Grammatology makes explicit the sources of
Derrida‟s widened notions of writing. Though it may sound abstract and isolated,
It should not be thought that Derrida‟s questioning concerning writing is
restricted to a purely metaphysical problem, of interest only to
philosophers. In fact, from the very start of the Grammatology, Derrida
situates his enquiry in a context wider than that of the academic discipline
of philosophy itself. His own focus on writing, he insists, is not an isolated
gesture, but reflects and is part of a more general revolution in modern
thought.62
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Writing, then, has already been extended to areas disassociated with the voice before Derrida
ever came on the scene, in such fields as cinematography and choreography, but also in
theoretical mathematics. Derrida writes,
Why is it [the situation of expanded “writing”] today in the process of
making itself known as such and after the fact? … I have already alluded
to theoretical mathematics; its writing … has never been absolutely linked
with a phonetic production. Within cultures practicing so-called phonetic
writing, mathematics is not just an enclave. … This enclave is also the
place where the practice of scientific languages challenges intrinsically
and with increasing profundity the ideal of phonetic writing and all its
implicit metaphysics (metaphysics itself) …63
The elements which challenge phonetic writing are present already in the system itself.
Theoretical mathematics is just one example of how a system of notation, completely separated
from the voice, functions.
The difference between the role of phonetic writing and that of theoretical mathematics
may be sharpened with a discussion of what Michael Lynch calls “rhetorical mathematics.” 64 In
relation to diagrams within text, and how the system of signification alters from the text to the
picture, Michael Lynch claims the move from the text to the pictures creates a “hermeneutic
passage.” Such a passage, he writes, “involves a movement through which the reader departs
from a written reference to the figure, examines the figure while being guided by the text‟s
directions, and then returns to the point of departure armed with resources for resuming the
reading.”65 The “notational devices,” of theoretical spaces “are not identical to the discursive text
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they accompany, they do not function simply as decorative ornaments,” rather they give a new
way of thinking of the arguments and ideas.66
The space on the page, separated from the text, which a diagram, or “theory picture,”
inhabits Lynch refers to as “rhetorical mathematics.” He writes:
Although theory pictures are neither naturalistic nor mathematical
representations, they evoke an impression of mathematicity. Theory
pictures often take the form of contingency tables and path-analytic
diagrams. They also make use of lines, points, and regular geometric
figures to depict spatial levels, cognitive dimensions, categorical
boundaries, and structural axes. In an important way, however, these
usages are metaphorical, not mathematical, because often it is difficult to
imagine how numerical coefficients ever could be assigned to the
structural axes and causal pathways. Yet theory pictures are not simply
“qualitative” or nonmathematical representations, because they use the
formal devices associated with mathematics to present and elaborate their
arguments.67
The space of theoretical diagrams, then, is mathematical in a metaphorical sense – in that there
are no numerical coefficients –yet aptly considered mathematical – in that they use formal
devices associated with mathematics (lines, points, etc.). Lynch‟s analysis helps us understand
how theoretical mathematics – an example of writing within the phonetic system that does not
utilize the phonetic elements – can serve as an example of non-phonetic understanding. Lynch‟s
“rhetorical mathematics” serves as a middle ground between the phonetic writing of the text, and
what actual theoretical mathematics does. That is, the hermeneutic passage from the text to the
picture is a microcosm of the difference between how thinking could operate within and outside
of phonetic writing. Though his examples favor the text (the diagrams are used to understand the
arguments), they are a first step in understanding how a change in writing is a change in
thinking.
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Other symptoms of the exhaustion of the epoch include the movement of information
retrieval and the human sciences. Derrida writes,
But beyond theoretical mathematics, the development of the practical
methods of information retrieval extends the possibilities of the “message”
vastly, to the point where it is no longer the “written” translation of a
language, the transporting of a signified which could remain spoken in its
integrity… This development, coupled with that of anthropology and the
history of writing, teaches us that phonetic writing, the medium of the
great metaphysical, scientific, technical, and economic adventure of the
West is limited in space and time and limits itself even as it is in the
process of imposing its laws upon the cultural areas that had escaped it.68
Theoretical mathematics, along with information retrieval, anthropology and the human sciences,
show a de-centering of the thought on phonetic writing; phonetic writing, instead of being the
telos of all writing, is only one possibility, “limited in space and time.” That Derrida call
phonetic writing a medium in the above passage is telling. Phonetic writing is conducive to a
particular form of thought; it carries with it its own notion of a center. As we shall see,
signification of the sign tends toward a transcendental signified. The de-centering of the phonetic
sign is a de-centering of the signified toward which it moves. To understand the danger this decentering holds for the metaphysics which rely on the system of phonetic writing, we need now
to turn to the function of the sign.
3.3 The Sign
The Saussurean notion of a sign is split between the signifier and the signified, and carries with it
notions of the sensible and the intelligible.69 All signs have both a sensible aspect – the voice can
be heard, writing can be seen – and an intelligible aspect: the referent which is being called to
mind. For instance, the word „table,‟ when spoken, has the sensible quality of the sounds of the
68
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word, and the intelligible aspect of the idea of a table. The written word „table,‟ also has a
sensible aspect, the marks on the page, but its referent – its intelligible aspect – is not only the
idea of table, but also the spoken word „table.‟70 Writing, then, is separated from the immediate
thought, exterior to the body, and refers to the voice just as much as to the idea.
Because phonetic writing‟s reference contains both the voice and the idea it is
traditionally thought of as a “signifier of a signifier.”71 That is, phonetic writing is a signifier
which signifies another signifier – the voice. The voice in turn signifies thought, which is the
traditional signified. Because of the proximity of the voice to thought, the voice has been given
preference over writing. This is what Derrida means by phonocentricism: “the absolute
proximity of the word and being.”72 The thought, or logos, is the origin of all signifiers and
toward which all signifiers refer. The thought is expressed (almost) immediately in speech, but is
deferred and delayed in writing. As a signifier of a signifier, writing has traditionally been
excluded as a sometimes necessary, but potentially dangerous, technique.
The metaphysical significance of this phonocentrism is far reaching. As Derrida writes:
The difference between signified and signifier belongs in a profound and
implicit way to the totality of a great epoch covered by the history of
metaphysics, and in a more explicit and more systematically articulated
way to the narrower epoch of Christian creationism and infinitism when
these appropriate the resources of Greek conceptuality.73
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The idea of the sign as consisting of sensible and intelligible aspects carries with it the notion of
a pure signified, “able to „take place‟ in its intelligibility, before its „fall,‟ before any expulsion
into the exteriority of the sensible here below.”74 That is, a signifier always signifies, and that
which is signified in its purity, which does not signify anything else, is thought to be the origin of
all signification. “This absolute logos,” Derrida writes, “was an infinite creative subjectivity in
medieval theology: the intelligible face of the sign remains turned toward the word and the face
of God.”75
3.4 Good and Bad Writing
Even when not explicitly related to a creator God, the notion of the sign is related to logos in
general wherein the signifier is second to the signified. The signifier receives its meaning only
from the signified, it is an unfortunate necessity that a signifier stands between us and the
signified. When the case seems otherwise, when it seems that the signifier is not relegated to
secondary position, it is a matter of metaphor.
[T]he writing of truth in the soul, opposed by Phaedrus (278a) to bad
writing (writing in the “literal” [propre] and ordinary sense, “sensible”
writing, “in space”), the book of Nature and God‟s writing, especially in
the Middle Ages; all that functions as metaphor in these discourses
confirms the privilege of the logos and found the “literal” meaning then
given to writing: a sign signifying a signifier itself signifying an eternal
verity, eternally thought and spoken in the proximity of a present logos. 76
The only exception to the historical degradation of writing as a “signifier of a signifier” is
writing taken as a metaphor for total knowledge. Good writing, the metaphorical writing, is
distinguished from bad writing, or “literal” writing: “there is therefore a good and bad writing:
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the good and natural is the divine inscription in the heart and the soul; the perverse and artful is
the technique, exiled in the exteriority of the body.”77
Good writing is pure knowledge understood immediately and entirely.
The good writing has therefore always been comprehended.
Comprehended as that which had to be comprehended: within a nature or a
natural law, created or not, but first thought within an eternal presence.
Comprehended, therefore, within a totality, and enveloped in a volume or
a book.78
Comprehended, that is, in both senses of the term. Not only understood, as good writing is
understood in totality – with nothing mysterious or alien – but also “comprehended” as
contained. Good writing is contained, “in a volume or a book,” in a closed system in which
nothing alien is allowed. He continues:
The idea of the book is the idea of a totality, finite or infinite, of the
signifier; this totality of the signifier cannot be a totality, unless a totality
constituted by the signified preexists it, supervises its inscriptions and its
signs, and is independent of it in its ideality. The idea of the book, which
always refers to a natural totality, is profoundly alien to the sense of
writing. It is the encyclopedic protection of theology and of logocentrism
against the disruption of writing …79
That is, the disruption of bad writing, which stands against good writing. Good writing, being
comprehended in a volume or book, represents the idea of totality – of total and complete
understanding. As such, it signifies a totality – a total signified – which must exist before and
independent of the signifier book. It is in this way that the idea of the book props up the notion of
the transcendental signified – a “pure signified,” which exists before the “fall,” of any sensible
signifier.
Derrida offers several examples of the metaphorical use of the book:
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Galileo: “It [the book of Nature] is written in a mathematical language.”
Descartes: “…to read in the great book of Nature…”
Bonnet: “It would seem more philosophical to me to presume that our
earth is a book that God has given to intelligences far superior to ours to
read, and where they study in depth the infinitely multiplied and varied
characters of His adorable wisdom.”80
In these examples, the book is only metaphorical. That is, there is no book in the concrete sense
of an actual, physical book. As metaphorical, these notions of the book carry with them the
historic prejudice of phonetic writing: that signs (in this case nature) signify transcendental
signifiers (the logos of God).
The metaphorical book is explicated further in Writing and Difference.81 Derrida
discusses Leibniz and Mallarmé in connection with the metaphorical book. Leibniz: “There is
only one Book, and this same Book is distributed throughout all books.”82 That is, there is one
Book (the capitalized, encompassing Book), which houses the absolute Logos of God, and all
books can only tend toward the Book. Similarly, Mallarmé writes, “I will go even further and
say: the Book for I am convinced that there is only One, and that it has [unwittingly] been
attempted by every writer, even by Geniuses.”83 He continues:
…revealing that, in general, all books contain the amalgamation of a
certain number of age-old truths; that actually there is only one book on
earth, that is the law of the earth, the earth‟s true Bible. The difference
between individual works is simply the difference between individual
interpretations of one true and established text, which are proposed in a
mighty gathering of those ages we call civilized or literary.84
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In both Leibniz and Mallarmé the Book represents a pre-existing reference toward which
individual books tend. There is only one Book, and books differ only “between individual
interpretations” of the “one true and established text.”
The Book serves in this case as a transcendental signified, with books as signifiers which
refer to the Book. Again this system is distinguished from writing. Derrida:
To write is not only to know that through writing, through the extremities
of style, the best will not necessarily transpire, as Leibniz thought it did in
divine creation, nor will the transition to what transpires always be willful,
nor will that which is noted down always infinitely express the universe,
resembling and reassembling it. It is also to be incapable of making
meaning absolutely precede writing: it is thus to lower meaning while
simultaneously elevating inscription. The eternal fraternity of theological
optimism and of pessimism: nothing is more reassuring, but nothing is
more despairing, more destructive of our books than the Leibnizian Book.
On what could books in general live, what would they be if they were not
alone, so alone, isolated worlds?85
With the notion of the Book, in both Leibniz and Mallarmé, meaning precedes writing. The best
writing can do, then, is to come as close as possible to this meaning. Writing, in Derrida‟s sense,
is to know that there is no meaning before it is written. “Meaning,” Derrida writes, “must await
being said or written in order to inhabit itself, and in order to become, by differing from itself,
what it is: meaning.”86
In Writing and Difference, then, Derrida uses both Leibniz and Mallarmé as examples of
writers who think in terms of a single Book. We can ask at this point, however, about the
inclusion of Mallarmé here. It is true that Mallarmé writes of the book in a metaphorical sense,
claiming, “all earthly existence must ultimately be contained in a book.”87 But he is also very
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influential for his work in experimental typography and book design.88 Indeed, Mallarmé claims
the book must be distinguished from the newspaper in that the latter “inflicts the
monotonousness of its eternally unbearable columns, which are merely strung down the pages by
hundreds.”89 The book, in contrast to this, should make more use of the space of the page and the
placement of the text. That is, in terms of the special format of the book in distinction to a
newspaper, Mallarmé says, “the work of art – which is unique or should be – must provide
illustrations.”90 It is instructive here to point out that Derrida groups Mallarmé with Leibniz in
terms of thinking of the metaphorical book, but does not mention Mallarmé‟s concern with the
physical constructs of a book. This is symptomatic of Derrida‟s own take on the book as an idea
rather than an object.91
In an interview with Henri Ronse, published in Positions92, Derrida again makes the
distinction between the book as a unified whole and writing. Ronse asks if Derrida‟s books “do
not form a single Book…” to which Derrida responds:
No. In what you call my books, which is first of all put in question is the
unity of the book and the unity “book” considered as perfect totality, with
all the implication of such a concept. And you know that these
implications concern the entirety of our culture, directly or indirectly…
Under these titles it is solely a question of a unique and differentiated
textural “operation,” if you will, whose unfinished movement assigns
itself no absolute beginning, and which, although it is entirely consumed
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by the reading of other texts, in a certain fashion refers only to its own
writing.93
Here Derrida separates his writing from the metaphorical notion of the book. His writing is a
“textual „operation,‟” and it refers only to itself. This is easily opposed to the idealized book
outlined above. Derrida is quick to distinguish his writing from a book because he understands
the medium of the book as traditionally favored a form of thinking that he wishes to escape.
We have seen through Of Grammatology (good vs. bad writing), Writing and Difference
(Books vs. books) and Positions (books vs. textual operations) that Derrida distinguishes the
book from writing. The distinction we noted first in Of Grammatology is an important strand
through many of Derrida‟s writings.
3.5 The Non-Idealized Book
For our purposes, it is important to note that while writing is discussed in different ways – as
both “literal,” and “metaphorical,” – the book is only “metaphorical.” That is, Derrida only
discusses the “idea of the book,” never as the notion of an actual, concrete book. We saw this
first, and in these terms in Of Grammatology, and the same procedure is followed in Writing and
Difference and his interview in Positions. This point is stated by Derrida himself years later in a
talk.
What I then called “the end of the book” came at the close of a whole
history: a history of the book, of the figure of the book, and even what was
called “the book of nature” (Galileo, Descartes, Hume, Bonnet Von
Schubert, and so on). In speaking of the ongoing “end of the book,” I was
referring to what was already in the offering, of course … but mainly I
meant the onto-encyclopedic or Hegelian model of the great total book,
the book of absolute knowledge linking its own infinite dispersion to
itself, in a circle.94
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That is, of course, exactly the point in question. When Derrida wrote about the book in Of
Grammatology, and, I have argued, in Writing and Difference and Positions, what he means is
the idea of a total book, of total knowledge. In this section I will argue that though in this later
piece, he does set out to discuss the book as a physical object, he continues to slip – through the
same metonymic shift he diagnosis in others – into thinking of the book in terms of the idealized
notion of absolute knowledge.
On the question of the “Book to Come,” Derrida claims that to question the book we
must separate the book from other elements. The question of the book should be kept separate
from writing, technologies of writing, and notions of work.95 Also, and this is the key for our
purposes, the book should not be confused with the question of supports:
[T]he question of the book should not be conflated with that of supports.
Quite literally, or else metonymically, (but we will continually be
concerned with these figures of the book, with these metonymical,
synechdochic, or simply metaphorical movements), it is possible and this
has certainly been done, to speak of books that have the most different
kinds of support – not just the classical ones but the quasi immateriality or
viruality of electronic and telematic operations of “dynamic supports”
with or without screens.96
There are two important points to pull from this. First, the question of supports seems to be the
question of the form of the book – the materiality of the book. Thinking in terms of books and
support, of books having different possible supports, and not being restricted to any one support,
Derrida‟s claim, rightly I think, allows us to think of the book as a physical object. At the same
time, thinking of the book itself as support, he creates a dichotomy between the physical makeup of the book, and the text within. This is a first step in asking how the text within can be
liberated. In other words, if the book is approached as a support for what is held within – and I
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take Derrida‟s claim that books can have “the most different kinds of support,” to claim that
“books” are not the physical object, but rather that which is “held” by the support –it is little
more than a container. It is then a question of freeing the contained from the container.
The second point in the above quote that will occupy us – and move us away from the
first point – is the metonymical shift. Derrida outlines the shift in meanings that lead the Greek
Bilblion from bark to paper to book. A similar metonymy would be necessary, Derrida claims, if
the word “library” is kept even when the building moves to house more electronic texts than
bound books. The metonymy that concerns us, however, is Derrida‟s own. Though he starts by
speaking of the book as a physical object, with supports, with materiality, he then goes on to tie
books with totality:
What then do we have the right to call “book” and in what way is the
question of right, far from being preliminary or accessory, here lodged at
the very heart of the question of the book? This question is governed by
the question of right, not only in its particular juridical form, but also in its
semantic, political, social, and economic form – in short, in its total form.
And the question of the book, as we shall see, is also that of a certain
totality.97
The question of the book – of what we have a right to call a book, given the different forms
books can take – metonymically shifts into the question of totality. This is because for Derrida,
the book is still the ideal of total knowledge, even when he begins by examining the materiality,
the physical object, of the book. It is still the idea of totality, only contained within the support of
the book.
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Another example of Derrida‟s neglect of the book form is pertinent for purposes of
juxtaposition against Keith Smith in the next chapter. In an interview on the effects of the
computer on philosophy and philosophical thought,98 Derrida says:
People often ask me, “Has your writing changed since you have been
writing on the computer?” I‟m incapable of replying. I don‟t know what
criteria to measure it by. There‟s certainly a change but I‟m not sure that it
affects what is written, even if it does modify the way of writing.99
The computer, for Derrida, modified “the way of writing,” that is, the manner in which the
document is arranged and edited. It had no effect on what is written, however.100 The point is
pressed home when Derrida goes on to say that while the computer, for many writers, is a first
chance to break with the styles of linear writing, such possibilities for him were exhausted before
the computer‟s advent. He says:
It was well before computers that I risked the most refractory texts in
relation to the norms of linear writings. It would easier for me now to do
this work of dislocation or typographical invention – of grafting,
insertions, cuttings and pasting – but I‟m not very interested in that any
more from that point of view and in that form. That was theorized and that
was done – then. … what I was able to try to change in the matter of page
formatting I did in the archaic age, if I can call it that, when I was still
writing by hand or with the old typewriter.101
The computer, then, does not represent for Derrida a break from the linear constricts of the
typewriter. Such breaks were possible, albeit less easily, before the computer. This is particularly
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The “what” in question here is doubly strange. For our purposes, we need only point out that Derrida does not
allow the developments of writing apparatuses alter his connection with the physical structure of the apparatus of the
book. It is also of interest to note that Derrida should not have a “what” he is writing. As we have seen in previous
sections of this chapter, there is no possibility for a transcendental signified for Derrida, though that seems to be
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true of Glas.102 Though Derrida famously juxtaposes the work of Hegel and Genet through
manipulation of the text, each page continues to be only a container for the text. The specific
functions of the format of the book are not explored. As we shall see in the next chapter, Keith
Smith represents a writer whose writing is affected by the possibilities of the computer, for the
manipulation of the text on the page, but also for the form of the book itself.
We must conclude, then, by claiming that Derrida never examines the non-idealized
book, even though a discussion and critique of the book is necessary. It is necessary for Derrida
for the same reason it is necessary for Deleuze: they both understand the medium of the book to
enhance and encourage a particular form of thought.
Though Derrida begins a discussion of the book as a physical object, many years after his
initial analysis of the metaphorical book, he shifts back to metaphor, back to the book as totality.
I claim he does so because he begins his examination of the book as support, which leads to the
question of allowing the text to escape the support of the bound book. This metonymy keeps him
from thinking of the book as a book, and thus thinking of the possible ways of thinking when the
medium of the book is taken seriously. Furthermore, in the discussion of the effects of the
computer, we see that Derrida, though concerned with the spacing of the text on the page, does
not extend his interest to the book – to the relation of multiple pages, as they function in a book.
The medium of the book, which Derrida attempts to distance himself from, is not explored,
rather Derrida only thinks of the metaphorical book.
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Chicago Press, 1987).
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CHAPTER 4:
SMITH AND THE BOOK
4.1 Introduction
We have seen how the treatment of the book in both Deleuze and Derrida overlooks the book for
the sake of the text (Deleuze) and the metaphorical nature of the idea of the book (Derrida). We
have also seen how these oversights are surprising considering both Deleuze and Derrida‟s
understanding of the book form to be a medium which reinforces particular forms of thought. In
this chapter we will examine the treatment of the book in the works of the artist Keith Smith. I
will argue that Smith uses the book as a physical object in an interesting way, and that by this
examination we can highlight how both Deleuze and Derrida overlooked a potentially important
manner of thinking of the book. We will see how Smith begins by examining the space of the
page and alterations within text to manipulate meaning of the written word. We will then see
how he extends these concepts to the interaction between the pages, and itineraries through the
book. Because many of Smith‟s examples are only possible because he is writing in a book, I
will use photographs and images where appropriate.
4.2. Running Manuscript and the Book Experience
In chapter 1 we investigated Moeglin-Delcroix‟s distinction between the book as content and the
book as support. The book as support is merely a container for the images or text within the
book. The book simply “holds” the texts. The book as content, on the other hand, integrates the
book form with text or image. Examples of the book as content were Smith‟s Book 106 and Book
126 (Figures 1-4). Speaking in terms of the relation between text and book, Smith makes a
similar distinction between the running manuscript and the book experience.
The running manuscript is a continuous strand of text which is then placed in a book. The
idea of the running manuscript is that the text takes precedent, with no notice of the book it will
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later be fitted within. The book in this case becomes simply a container for the completed
manuscript. This thesis is an example of a running manuscript. The ideas are being conveyed
with little note of the formatting or medium on which it will be presented. When a running
manuscript is fitted in a book as many pages are used as necessary; the pages merely hold the
pre-existing text.
A book experience, on the other hand, is the use of the book itself103 in relation to the
text. That is, the book is in mind when the text is being written. Whereas a running manuscript
treats the book as a shell, Smith writes,
[A] book, that is the format, can be more. It can be utilized by the poet, or
writer of prose, or even the writer of instructional or technical manuals, to
reinforce the text. The art of oratory assists the speaker in conveying a
message. An investigation of the inherent properties of the book format
hints of ways the vehicles can efficiently, vividly, and with clarity, aid the
revelation of the written work. It can open the process of writing for the
writer to include a possibility of visual layout assisting what is said, as
opposed to typing a running manuscript.104
The book experience, Smith claims, can aid the clarity and effect of the writing. The book form,
far from being a mute medium, can be utilized to enhance the writing. The idea of the book being
more than a mute medium is precisely what fuels the critiques of the book we saw in Deleuze
and Derrida. The book form can be used not only for poets, but for other sorts of writers, and, I
would like to claim, for philosophy as well.
Smith‟s notion of the book experience corresponds closely with that of the book as
content. Both attempt to think of the book as more than a storage place for text or image. Indeed,
as we saw in chapter 3, when Derrida speaks of the book to come, he begins with thinking of the
book as support. It is precisely this reason that he continues to slide into thinking of the book as
103
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metaphor. When the book is taken as only a support for a text, it is natural to ask how the text
can be liberated from such support. When, on the other hand, the book is taken as an
indispensable property of a writing – the text having been written for the form of the book – the
book must be thought as a necessary component of the work.
Furthermore, Smith, like Deleuze, Derrida and McLuhan, understand that thinking of the
book in this way is due to specific historical developments. About the benefits of the advent of
computers, Smith writes
The advantage of a home computer is not that it does the same thing [as a
pencil or typewriter] more easily and faster. It does neither. Composing on
the computer allows the writer to be visual, to compose the page, as well as
the text.105
Where previously a writer would turn over the manuscript to the publisher, having the latter
arrange the text in the book, now the author can be in charge of the text and the book. The
computer enables new possibilities when it comes to book formatting, but it also brings into
contrast how books have previously been made. It is only with new possibilities that we are able
to notice our own environments. Indeed even this thesis would not be possible without the
developments which first brought the role of the book to the forefront, but also enabled the use of
photographs to be assimilated into word files. That I am able to discuss a thinking only possible
through the use of the book while writing a document on a computer which will be stored in an
electric database is evidence of the importance of historic developments to thinking and what can
be thought.
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4.3 New Possibilities in Writing
In this section we will examine some of the examples Smith gives in his discussion of the book
experience. He begins with a discussion of how writing can do more than what is heard. He
writes,
Text may be so written that hearing the words is only part of what the
writer has said. Then, format must be experienced. Incorporating the
format as part of the content is an extension of the statement. … Space
between, even space within words, can change what is said:
stiFLED
gaTHEREd
sNAKED away106
In these examples we see more than what would be audible had these words been read aloud.
“Words-within-words are meant to be seen and not heard.”107
Words-within-words deal only with the font and text of a specific site of a page. This is
the beginning, but by no means the entirety, of thinking of the book experience. Smith extends
his thinking of the specific function of the book to the spacing between pages. That is, the book
has a specific form which, when emphasized, enables certain possibilities lost in a running
manuscript. One such possibility is the manipulation of the pacing of the book. The extension of
a text through multiple pages can have different affects on the pacing of the reading, depending
on the layout and number of words on each page. Concerning the extension of text over several
pages, Smith writes,
It might be a full page of text, a paragraph, sentence or only a single word
that crosses the gutter or the fore edge to compose the following page.
Now the page is not relegated to support, but has been composed in
keeping with the text it contains. The book reinforces, and therefore is part
of the statement.108
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Here again the book is more than merely a support for the text. The text and the book come
together as a book experience. The text works with the format. Figure 5 shows the spread of
pages 40-41. The text printed on the edge of page 41 reads:
dead/ day my eyes/ in stead/ remain staring/ to get out of/ my mind109

Figure 5 Keith Smith, Text in Book Format. Photograph of pp. 41-42. (Photograph by
author.)
Figure 6 shows the next spread, pages 42 and 43. The text on the edge of page 42 reads:
of winter/ breaks open/ pain fast I lie/ bedfast my body refuses/ so late/
flashes from …110
The format in this example serves a specific purpose. Smith writes:
The reader turns the page to read the first line existing on the front and
back of the sheet. Then the reader must return to the initial page to start
the next line which continues around the edge. … The exaggeration of

109

Ibid. p. 41, where the “/” indicates at least double space from the following line.

110

Ibid. p. 42, where the “/” indicates the same.

55

turning pages back and forth purposely sets up tension, conflict or
confusion. It emphasizes the writing is created with format in mind.111

Figure 6 Keith Smith, Text in Book Format. Photograph of pp. 42-43. (Photograph by
author.)
Furthermore, the text on the edge of the page can be read as inclusive to either side, or read
together. This creates a different meaning for the words, depending on whether they are read
together or not. For example, turning the pages to read around the edge, one would read:
dead of winter/ day breaks/ my eyes open/ in pain/ stead fast I lie/ remain
bedfast/ staring my body refuses/ to get out so/ of late/ my mind flashes
from…112
Thus the poem can be read entirely on page 41, entirely on 42, or with the text together. All three
options enable the meaning of the text to change when combined, and all three can stand alone.
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Another example of the interaction of the book format and text is shown in figures 7, 8
and 9. In figure 7 we see writing near the gutter of the book in bold on page 54 (“This is writing
which is complete in itself”). Figure 8 shows page 57, in which another set of writing in bold
(“Seeing the page as a segment – always dependent in needing a context from page to page”).
Figure 9 shows the turning of the page, which reveals both sets of writing simultaneously. “Since
the two bold face texts are not on consecutive pages,” Smith writes, “each can be read
individually in time, through pagination.”113 The two texts, however, are combined through the
turning action of the page: “for this instance the two texts are seen at once, read as a compound
unit.”114

Figure 7 Keith Smith, Text in Book Format. Photograph of pp 54-55. A first set of
bolded writing is visible with this spread. (Photograph by author.)
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Figure 8 Keith Smith, Text in Book Format. Photograph of pp56-57. Here we see the
second set of bolded writing. (Photograph by author.)

Figure 9 Keith Smith, Text in Book Format. Photograph of pp 54-57. Turning the page
exposes both sets of text at the same time. Despite their initial separation, the format of
the book can be used to make such connections. (Photograph by author.)

58

These examples show how the format of the book – the movement of the pages – enables
particular reading depending on the placement of the text. The idea of the movement through the
book is also a feature of what Smith calls the “itineraries through a book.” Smith discusses
various itineraries through the book; that is, various ways of moving through the book. For our
purposes we will focus only on the possibilities of multiple readings. Texts can be compiled in
such a way that the format allows for multiple readings. Smith provides several examples of
short texts which can be read in numerous ways. In Figures 10 and 11 we see an image of a book
which can have a primary and secondary reading. The primary is depicted by the pagination at
the bottom of each page in the image; the secondary by the number at the top. To follow the
pages on the bottom would be to read the entire text. The pagination on the top represents a
secondary reading, or synopsis of the text.

Figure 10 Keith Smith, Paper Route, in Text in Book Format, p. 68; Primary and
secondary reading.
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Figure 11 Keith Smith, Paper Route in Text in Book Format, p. 69; Primary and
secondary reading.
The pages of the book enable different readings, as seen in these examples. Following the
primary reading, the pagination at the bottom, would result in all the text being read. The
secondary reading allows for a synopsis; large sections of the text would be left out. The use of
the pages as they function in a bound codex is even more pronounced in the Figures 12-14. Here
the overlapping process of flipping back and forth in a book is explored. The ordering can be
manipulated because of the specific form of the book. The directionality of the book is used as an
interactive tool with the reader. While it is possible to configure a text to move in one direction
through a book, Smith shows us how a text can also be used in conjunction with the book. Figure
12 is a short text whose ordering is explored in Figures 13 and 14.
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Figure 12 Keith Smith, Kind of Lousy in Text in Book Format, p. 79.

Figure 13 Keith Smith, Kind of Lousy in Text in Book Format, p. 80. Here the reader is
given clues to possible readings by the pagination at the bottom. Though only six
physical pages, the book becomes a fourteen page text.
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Figure 14 Keith Smith, Kind of Lousy, in Text in Book Format, pp 80-81. Here the book
format is extended to fourteen physical pages, and the need to return to previous pages
is eliminated.
The book format offers various opportunities to manipulate the itineraries, or movement
through the book‟s pages. Whereas figure 12 leaves the motion and meaning of the text nearly
completely to the reader due to a complete lack of pagination, figures 13 and 14 give more
structure to the process through the book. Figure 13, moreover, gives a special emphasis by way
of numerous returns. This layout, Smith writes, “has a sense of performance in the contingently
leafing through the book to find the next segment of the plot.”115 That is, the reader will have to
return to the same place numerous times to re-read the text. Figure 14, alternately, reduces the
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physical repetition of returning to the same page, but maintains the overlap of the text. In this
case, the reader moves through the book‟s pages consecutively, textual repetitions appearing on
different pages, as the need arises. In all cases, however, the form of the book is utilized to
manipulate the role of the text. That is, the pages and the directionality of the book are what
enable variations of the reading. The book is understood as an integral part of the text and the
text‟s relation to the reader.
4.4. Conclusion
Smith offers us a way to think of the book as more than simply a shell for pre-existing text.
Through the examples discussed here we see how an emphasis on the book – as book experience,
or book as content – can affect writing. Smith writes:
These previous examples hint of different way of writing which explores
the format as part of the conceived text. The book influences, even creates
the content by placing the words into context. The form is part of what is
written. How the book is constructed can determine what is said in the
text. Meaning is more than writing.116
It is precisely this way of thinking of the book – as concrete physical object, whose
alterations can affect the text within – that I juxtapose against the role of the book discussed in
Deleuze and Derrida. We have seen that both Deleuze and Derrida understood the book as a
medium which affects thought. Furthermore, we have seen that both Deleuze and Derrida fail to
think of the book in their treatments of the book. Where Deleuze focuses only on the text within
the book, Derrida only thinks of the book as a metaphor for total knowledge. Smith, as we have
seen, investigates the book as format which offers important possibilities for writing. The book
experience is a conjunction of the writing and the format which both Deleuze and Derrida
overlook.
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The role of the book is more than simply formal. Deleuze and Derrida, like McLuhan,
take the medium of knowledge to be a very important factor in the way thinking can occur. That
is, thought is shaped by the medium it uses. For this reason the medium is not mute. What is at
stake for both Deleuze and Derrida is the role of philosophy, which has always been tied to the
book. To distinguish their philosophy from traditional thought they must distinguish their books
from the traditional medium of the book. They must make the case that the books they are
writing are different from how books have previously worked.
It is the necessity of this project which makes their failure so evident: they are not
thinking of the book, they do not take the book as a medium to be altered. Rather they deal only
with the writing within the book or the book as metaphor for total knowledge. Smith, however,
does think of the book in terms of a medium. By combining the text with the book – by thinking
of the book with the text – he offers examples of how the medium of the book can be used to
affect the text within. This is no mere formality, in the sense of form over content. Rather, the
content of the text is affected by the form of the book.
This, I believe, is important for philosophy. If thought is altered by the medium, and if
Deleuze and Derrida think this alteration is important enough to attempt a separation from the
traditional notions of book, I take it to be obvious that understanding how the medium of the
book can work with and affect the text is imperative. If it is worth changing the medium to
change the thought, we should learn to think of the book on its own terms.

64

REFERENCES
Bonta, Mark and John Protevi. Deleuze and Geophilosophy. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 2004
Borges, Jorge Luis. Labyrinths, Selected Stories and Other Writings. New York: New
Directions, 1962.
Bright, Betty. No Longer Innocent: Book Arts in America 1960-1980. New York: Granary
Books, 2005.
Deleuze, Gilles. Difference and Repetition. Trans. Paul Patton. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1994.
Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus. Trans. Brian Massumi. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1987
Derrida, Jacques. Glas. Paris: Édition Denoël/Gonthier, 1981.
---. Of Grammatology. Trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1976
---. Writing and Difference. Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978.
---. Paper Machine. Trans. Rachel Bowlby. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005.
---. Positions. Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981
---. Truth in Painting. Trans. Geoff Bennington and Ion McLeod. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1987.
Drucker, Johanna. The Century of Artist’s Books. New York: Granary Books, 1995.
Else, G.F. Aristotle’s Poetics: The Arguments. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957.
Johnson, Chris. Derrida. New York: Routledge, 1999.
Joyce, James. Finnegan’s Wake. New York: Viking Press, 1939.
Klement, Kevin, C. “Gottlob Frege.” The Internet Encycloopedia of Philosophy. March 17,
2008.
Landow, George P., ed. Hyper/Text/Theory. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994
Lynch, Michael. “Picture of Nothing? Visual Construals in Social Theory.” Sociological Theory,
Spring (1991): 1-21

65

Mallarmé, Stéphane. Selected Poems, Essays and Letters. Trans. Bradford Cook. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1956.
---. “The Book: A Spiritual Instrument.” Selected Poetry and Prose. Ed. Mary Ann Caws. New
York: New Directions, 1982. 80-83.

McLuhan, Marshal. The Media is the Message. New York: Bantam Books, 1967.
---. Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man. New York: New American Library, 1964
Moeglin-Delcroix. Esthéthiques du livres d’artistes, 1960 – 1980. Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale
de France, 1997.
Nancy, Jean-Luc. Being Singular Plural. Trans. Robert D. Richardson and Anne E. O‟Bryne.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000
Ong, Walter. “Reading, Technology and the Nature of Man: An Interpretation.” The Yearbook of
English Studies. (1980): 132-149
Seem, Mark D. “Liberation of Difference: Toward a Theory of Antiliterature.” New Literary
History Autumn (1973): 119-133
Skerl, Jenny. William S. Burroughs. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1985.
Smith, Keith. Book 106, Construct. Offset edition of 200, 22.8 x 13.3 cm. Rochester, NY: Keith
Smith Books, 1985.
---. Book 126, In Between Lines. Edition of 15, Silver prints and texts on transparencies.
Supported Concertina binding with clam shell. 34.9 x 27.9 x 4 cm. Rochester, NY: Keith
Smith Books, 1988
---. Book 200: An Anecdotal Bibliography. Rochester NY: Keith Smith Books, 2000.
---. Text in the Book Format. Rochester, NY: Keith Smith Books, 1997.
Williams, James. Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide.
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003.

66

VITA
Scott Louis Ziegler was born in New Orleans, Louisiana, in 1982. He moved to Memphis,
Tennessee, in 1990 and remained there through high school. He received his Bachelor of Arts
in philosophy from Louisiana State University in 2006.

67

